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Summary
The term ‘groupthink’, coined by Irving 
L. Janis in 1972 is a phenomenon that is 
one of the worst factors distorting deci-
sions. Groupthink evolves under peculiar 
antecedent conditions (or pre-requisites) 
and shows specific symptoms when in ac-
tion. In this article, these conditions and 
symptoms are reviewed, examples are 
given from global history to demonstrate 
its adverse impacts and the management 
of the phenomenon is illustrated by posi-
tive examples. Then an attempt is made 
at proving that the rise and fall of for-
eign currency lending, perhaps the larg-
est economic disaster in post-communist 
Hungary, can be traced back to the phe-
nomenon called groupthink. 
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What is groupthink and why do we 
regard it as a problem? 
When it comes to the term ‘groupthink’, 
virtually every literature essay quotes the 
recognised works of Irving L. Janis (Janis, 
1972; 1982), who coined this word to de-
scribe the phenomenon also examined 
in this article. 
According to Janis, members of high-
status decision-making groups may devel-
op such extreme forms of camaraderie 
and solidarity that they suppress dissent, 
valuing group membership and harmony 
above else. This silencing of ideas that de-
part from the majority thinking can have 
devastating results: it may lead to the dis-
tortion of reality, to the adoption of risky 
policies, and to the abandonment of ethi-
cal considerations (Schnall and Green-
berg, 2012). Similarly, the Merriam-Web-
ster’s dictionary defines this expression 
as “a pattern of thought characterized 
by self-deception, forced manufacture of 
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consent, and conformity to group values 
and ethics” (Bénabou, 2013). Moreover, 
in the literature the terms “collective 
denial and wilful blindness”, “Mutually 
Assured Delusion (MAD)” (Bénabou, 
2013) and “collaborative spiralling of ir-
rationality” (Szanto, 2017) also appear as 
descriptions of groupthink. 
As it is obvious from the definitions 
above, groupthink is a very dangerous 
phenomenon, which needs to be diag-
nosed and handled if and when it seems 
to occur, in order to avoid great prob-
lems. In this paper, after describing the 
accurate general characteristics of group-
think, diverse relevant examples are ana-
lysed in terms of groupthink, in order to 
demonstrate the versatility of the phe-
nomenon. The examples are taken from 
various ages in history: from ancient 
times to contemporary problems of the 
21st century. These examples are divided 
into two groups, separated by the correct 
or incorrect handling of groupthink in 
the given situation. 
Antecedent conditions and 
symptoms of groupthink
As Janis and subsequent researchers have 
stated, the so-called antecedent conditions 
are the observable causes of groupthink. 
In other words, they are the conditions 
“that produce, elicit, or facilitate the oc-
currence of the syndrome” (Golkar, 2013).
One primary and several secondary 
antecedent conditions have been identified. 
The primary antecedent condition neces-
sary for groupthink is a highly cohesive 
group. Secondary antecedent conditions 
can be clustered into two sub-groups. The 
first sub-group contains those related to 
the structural or administrative faults of 
the organisation, namely: 1) insulation of 
the group; 2) leader preference for cer-
tain decisions (in other words, directive 
leadership); 3) lack of norms requiring 
methodical procedures; and 4) homoge-
neity of the members’ social background 
and ideology. The second sub-group in-
cludes conditions related to the decision-
making context, including: 1) high stress 
from external threats with low hope of a 
better solution than the leader’s; 2) low 
self-esteem, temporarily induced by the 
group’s perception of recent failures, 
excessive difficulties on current decision-
making tasks, and moral dilemmas (Gol-
kar, 2013).
Here we need to take a quick glance 
at the accurate meaning of the more im-
portant one of the above-listed anteced-
ent conditions. Group cohesiveness can be 
described as the members’ overall at-
traction to a particular group, which is a 
result of the ‘esprit de corps’ (a feeling 
of pride and shared mutual loyalty) and 
amiability between the individual group 
members. Directive leadership is defined as 
a group member’s perception of being 
influenced by a leader who pre-meditates 
a viewpoint early in the decision-making 
process and ignores procedures for eval-
uating alternatives. Group insulation refers 
to the perceived isolation from external 
opinions in a social decision-making pro-
cess (i.e. the experience of a strong so-
cial homogeneity but less strong ties to 
society). Stress generally refers to any en-
vironmental, social or internal demand 
which requires and individual to adjust 
his/her individual patterns of behaviour, 
and is experienced when important deci-
sion outcomes carry a high threat of loss 
and are perceived to be one’s personal 
responsibility (Breitsohl et al., 2015).
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The observable consequences or symp-
toms of groupthink are seen as follows: 1) 
an illusion of invulnerability; 2) an un-
questioned belief in the group’s inherent 
morality; 3) collective efforts to rational-
ise; 4) stereotyped views of enemy leaders 
as evil, weak or stupid; 5) self-censorship 
of deviations from the group consen-
sus; 6) a shared illusion of unanimity; 
7) direct pressure on any member who 
expresses strong arguments against any 
of the group’s stereotypes; 8) the emer-
gence of self-appointed mind guards to 
protect or screen the group from adverse 
information. These eight symptoms are 
the primary factors suitable for identify-
ing groupthink (Golkar, 2013).
Preventing and handling 
groupthink 
Let us see a few characteristic cases of 
groupthink in history with focus on how 
the phenomenon was or could have been 
prevented and/or handled, and on the 
possible methods of promoting the ef-
forts to combat them.
How harmful groupthink can be? Negative 
examples
This part includes cases with adverse out-
comes in order to analyse what exactly 
went wrong, and how it fitted into the 
framework of groupthink. 
USA-related wars 
As a result of their analyses of wars relat-
ed to the very existence and the modern 
history of the USA, certain authors con-
cluded that the pattern of groupthink 
was observable. In relation to the Inde-
pendence War, or more exactly, to the 
British military intervention of 1768, and 
much later, to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the 
Vietnam War and especially to the 2003 
Second Gulf War against Iraq, it is rather 
apparent that groupthink-related factors 
played a huge role (York, 2011).
Neil L. York compares the mistakes 
made by King George III and by Presi-
dent George W. Bush in their decisions 
to use military power instead of peace-
ful alternatives. York claims that in both 
instances policy-makers argued that they 
had virtually no other option. There may 
have been a certain amount of deceit and 
disingenuousness in what they claimed 
publicly, but it also appears that they of-
ten meant what they said, and that they 
acted sincerely, however illogical or ill-in-
formed their actions may now appear to 
have been (just remember, for instance, 
the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction 
possessed by President Saddam Hussein). 
Reality is a construct of our brain, a con-
struct we devise: so it was for George III 
and George W. Bush (York, 2011).
In these cases, the homogeneity of 
the advisory circles surrounding the two 
statesmen included people of homoge-
neous backgrounds and political pref-
erences (in case of President Bush e.g. 
Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, etc.), 
who also filtered the information for the 
president, thus insulating the ultimate 
decision-maker. 
The May 1996 Mount Everest disaster
On the tragic day of 10 May 1996 two 
separate expeditions – guided by the New 
Zealander Rob Hall and the American 
Scott Fischer, respectively – attempted to 
reach the summit of Mount Everest, and 
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lost several people. Both teams ignored 
the normal turnaround time of 14:00 
hours, and climbed while a severe storm 
was approaching. Moreover they did not 
have enough oxygen in their canisters to 
do so (Burnette et al., 2011).
Several antecedent conditions of 
groupthink are well observable in this 
case. Group cohesion manifested in a 
rather unorthodox way, because as one 
of the team members put it: “we were a 
team in name only”. There was, however 
a sense of solidarity, friendship and mutu-
al respect within the group, and most im-
portantly, as a superordinate goal, there 
was the sole purpose of reaching the sum-
mit. Thus directive leadership occurred 
as a consequence of self-censorship to at-
tain the superordinate goal. Stress is ap-
parently related to such extreme moun-
taineering expeditions, but in this case 
recent failures added extra stress (Bur-
nette et al., 2011).
The symptoms of groupthink are di-
agnosable – all in connection with the su-
perordinate goal of the groups – such as 
the overestimation of the group, pressure 
towards uniformity, and closed-mind-
edness in the group. All these occurred 
because of the sole purpose to reach the 
summit, and distorted the sense of reality 
of even such experienced mountaineers, 
costing them the lives of their majority 
(Burnette et al., 2011). 
‘Volkthink’ 
The ‘Volkthink’ model is a specific advanced 
form of groupthink, and is defined as the 
association of certain policies with a cohe-
sive but depersonalised social identity in a 
way that these policies function as a form 
of identity preservation or promotion. 
Consequently, the antecedent conditions 
are 1) high level of social cohesion and of 
homogeneity; 2) a strong but deperson-
alised group identity; and 3) a situational 
relationship between group identity and 
specific policies. National identity may be 
the most obvious example of this pattern 
(Carolan, 2016).
The special vulnerability of small 
states, such as Ireland and Iceland, to 
Volkthink is an interesting idea. Reports 
of the economic difficulties in both coun-
tries reveal similar patterns of excessive 
interest-group influence, inadequate 
regulatory capacity, inappropriately close 
relationships and a dominant social and 
political consensus, intolerant to op-
posing viewpoints. Both countries are 
of relatively homogeneous population, 
with smaller monitoring systems and less 
competitors in the market. In both sec-
tors, the economic success of particular 
sectors – in this case perhaps most impor-
tantly, the banking sector – was positively 
associated with national and social iden-
tity (Carolan, 2016).
Therefore, any criticism of the eco-
nomic success was understood as a threat 
to the social identity of the state. It is not 
surprising that in such an environment, 
the necessary steps to prevent or, later on, 
to handle financial disasters could not 
have been taken, because this attitude 
had led to a system of dysfunctional pub-
lic policies. As a consequence, financial 
bubbles evolved and existed for a pro-
longed period of time (Carolan, 2016).
Online financial communities
Groupthink theory also has an impact 
on micro-finances, as revealed by finan-
cial online communities. In this case the 
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largest problem is conformity-seeking be-
haviour within these communities, which 
is connected to stress, cohesiveness and 
group insulation, and the lack of infor-
mation from outside. Stress has a role 
here, because such online communities 
have a very strong stress-mitigating effect, 
but in many cases this effect has an ad-
verse impact on financial decisions. In-
group homogeneity and the strong intra-
focus of the group lead to cohesiveness 
and to group insulation. Finally, the lack 
of statistical support to decisions – due 
to the absence of external information – 
may lead to directive leadership, further 
increasing the adverse impact on indi-
vidual financial decisions made by the 
group members. Many disadvantageous 
financial decisions can be traced back to 
these phenomena, and their effects were 
particularly clearly visible during the fi-
nancial crisis after 2008 (Breitsohl et al., 
2015).
Dysfunction of EBA’s stress tests 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
is one of the three micro-prudential fi-
nancial supervisory agencies of the Eu-
ropean Union, established after the 2008 
crisis in order to enhance control over 
the financial markets of the EU. One of 
its main tasks is to conduct stress tests of 
the market. The failure of the system be-
came apparent when, after the 2011 stress 
test of Spanish banks, which confirmed 
that everything was in order, in June 2012 
the EU had to bail-out the Spanish bank-
ing sector by more than a hundred bil-
lion euros. We cannot tell for sure what 
exactly happened, but most probably a 
sort of groupthink effect worked, i.e. the 
national delegates of the EBA Board did 
not want to vote against a specific coun-
try in fear of a possible future retaliation 
against their own countries in a similar 
situation, and as a result, they decided 
in a more “conservative” way (Szegedi, 
2018). 
How to handle groupthink? Positive examples
Mention must be made of two positive ex-
amples when groupthink was prevented 
and/or handled appropriately. One of 
them includes the Sanhedrin of ancient 
Israel, and the practices and processes 
that may be adopted and built in our 
contemporary practices. The second one 
deals with genuine contemporary solu-
tions for corporate governance. 
The Sanhedrin of ancient Israel
In ancient Israel, since the period of the 
Second Temple, the Great Sanhedrin 
had become the supreme judicial forum, 
although it also had political functions 
besides acting as a court. Even after the 
destruction of the Second Temple in 70 
CE, it managed to maintain its position, 
although with restricted powers (Jany, 
2016).
Perhaps the most important case 
heard by the Great Sanhedrin, the trial of 
Jesus Christ, was conducted in the period 
of the Second Temple. One would argue 
that this procedure would be the best ex-
ample of the malfunctions of groupthink. 
However, the crucifixion of Jesus – from 
the believer’s perspective – was a crucial 
and inevitable part of God’s Plan of Sal-
vation, and therefore cannot be deemed 
as adverse, but more importantly, accord-
ing to the relevant literature, the Great 
Sanhedrin had very good practices to 
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prevent groupthink, and what happened 
to Jesus before the court was more of a 
politically motivated exception.
According to the Talmud the Great 
Sanhedrin’s leadership system was very 
effective in preventing a single person’s 
opinion from dominating others. The 
leadership was divided between multiple 
individuals to prevent harmful domineer-
ing and giving too much latitude to dis-
senters. The “Aboth” (“Ethics of the Fa-
thers”) part of the Talmud dictates that 
“one should hate acting superior” [Aboth 
1:10] and also that “judge not alone, for 
none may judge alone save One [G-d]” 
[Aboth 4:8]. The essence of impartial 
leadership is encapsulated in this state-
ment: “Say not ‘Accept my view’ for they 
are free but not thou” [i.e. “they are free 
to concur, but not thou to force them to 
concur”] [Aboth 4:8]. In plain English, 
the last sentence says that no juror of 
the Sanhedrin can be forced to concur 
i.e. agree with the majority (Schnall and 
Greenberg, 2012).
Besides that, open debates were 
prompted between the members, and in 
some cases even the nasi (the president 
of the court) could be removed in or-
der to prevent directive leadership (see 
e.g. the story of Hillel [Pesahim 66a] or 
the debate between the rabbis Yehoshua 
and Gamliel [Rosh Hashana 25a, Bera-
koth 27b, Bekoroth, 36a]). Another very 
important similar instruction was that 
the junior members had to vote prior 
to seniors, so that the less powerful and 
influential could not be influenced by 
the opinions of the more powerful and 
influential [Sanhedrin, 32a]. It was ex-
plicitly prohibited for a member to refer 
to the majority vote as the ground of his 
own vote, and the ‘devil’s advocate’ posi-
tion was introduced [Sanhedrin 29a]. In 
capital cases even stronger pre-cautions 
were made. For instance, if all members 
supported the conviction, the final deci-
sion was mandatorily postponed until the 
next day [Sanhedrin 40a] (Schnall and 
Greenberg, 2012).
Even around the trial of Jesus there 
are signs of this way of thinking, the 
proofs are recorded in the Holy Bible. 
Nicodemus seems to provide an example 
of an in-group member who pursues the 
exploration of all the effective alterna-
tives from a very rational perspective. Nic-
odemus deemed necessary to meet Jesus 
beforehand [John 3], offered a tentative 
defence for him during the trial [John 7] 
and finally helped to bury him [John 19] 
(Bell, 2016).
Unfortunately, these practices were 
somehow not transferred to the early 
Christian communities, where many fac-
tions or sub-groups of the church came 
to existence in a very short time, who did 
not entirely agree with the mainstream 
and became rival groups. Paul, who was 
in many cases very tolerant and benign 
as a leader, took charge of combating the 
Judaisers’ views even to the point of con-
fronting Apostle Peter of Antioch [Acts 
15:1] (Bell, 2016). This argument abso-
lutely reflects group insulation and cohe-
siveness along with directive leadership.
What can we learn and adopt from 
the practices of the Sanhedrin in the 
21st century? According to Schnall and 
Greenberg, especially the “devil’s advo-
cate” and the “second-chance meeting” 
are relevant for corporate and organiza-
tional decision-making, but also the di-
verse membership of the board can help. 
(The Sanhedrin also consisted of mem-
bers with a homogeneous social status 
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and ideological/religious background, 
but made steps to prevent the failures 
stemming from this.) It can be a realis-
tic solution if diverse groups (e.g. inves-
tors, creditors, etc.) nominated at least a 
part of the board members (Schnall and 
Greenberg, 2012). Encouraging diverse 
options in decision-making – which is in 
the heart of the Sanhedrin’s practice – is 
one of the most important means of com-
bating groupthink (Kelman et al., 2017). 
Corporate governance without groupthink
There is another type of diversity, pref-
erable for corporate and organizational 
decision-making boards, namely gender 
diversity. According to studies, gender di-
versity can be an antidote to groupthink 
in several ways. First of all, diversity itself 
provides more psychological independ-
ence than the current system of ‘inde-
pendent directors’. (This is also true for 
educational and occupational diversity.) 
The main advantages of employing fe-
male directors has its roots in the fact 
that as female directors must overcome 
many system barriers to attain board po-
sitions, they tend to be highly motivated 
and prepared for meetings. Also, female 
directors typically come from outside 
the groups and networks most directors 
come from, and this makes them ‘outsid-
ers’, therefore giving them a different 
perspective (Kamalnath, 2017).
Another useful tool to combat group-
think is the Group Support Systems (GSS), 
which has been in place for more than 
two decades. GSS is basically a constantly 
evolving computer-based technology for 
teamwork. It structures the group deci-
sion-making process in three major ways: 
1) focusing on group members’ efforts 
on the task or problem to be solved by 
the group; 2) equalising group member 
participation; and 3) increasing consen-
sus-reaching. Being a technological solu-
tion designed for group decision-making, 
it aggregates the opinions of the group, 
promotes process structuring, expands 
the information processing capabilities 
of the group, and broadens the perspec-
tive of the group by facilitating access to 
external information. Through all these 
functions, it is able to provide a larger 
number of alternatives, reduce the time 
required for making a decision, and in-
crease the use of external information 
and improve the decision quality (Miran-
da and Saunders, 1995).
Studies in the field of behavioural op-
erations management increasingly focus 
on the psychological factors and dynam-
ics that drive operation on the level of 
the individual worker. They have identi-
fied ‘Groupthink Behaviour’ (GTB) as 
an adverse group behaviour pattern. The 
relevant studies and the literature have 
found that the negative impacts of GTB 
on project work can be counterbalanced 
by a high level of (individually) perceived 
internal control and conscientiousness, 
and to a lesser degree, by a high level 
of interpersonal evaluation among the 
group members (Riccobono et al., 2016).
Groupthink and foreign currency 
loans in Hungary 
According to Farkas “a foreign currency 
loan, regardless of the fact whether it is 
disbursed and repaid in a foreign cur-
rency or […] in different currency, does 
not differ from any other loan” (Farkas, 
2017). However, foreign currency loans 
triggered significant changes in the prac-
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tice of lending in Hungary. The complex-
ity and the absence of transparency of the 
loan contracts were especially problem-
atic. As Bodnár puts it, “these contracts 
were rather complicated, and their evalu-
ation required a level of professional 
banking understanding the judiciary nat-
urally did not have”. And in this quote he 
refers to that part of the judiciary, which 
had to try to serve justice in lawsuits re-
lated to these loans (Bodnár, 2013).
It started in the early 2000s, when 
foreign currency loans were authorised, 
originally only in the case of real estate 
loans. After 2004, however, the socialist-
liberal government made this construc-
tion available for home equity loans as 
well. Interest rates were compelling, and 
many people wished to take advantage of 
the foreign currency margin. However, as 
the global economic crises escalated after 
2008, the advantage turned into a disad-
vantage, and the worth of the instalments 
became multiplied sums of the original 
ones. This led to a disaster in many ways 
(Neményi, 2009). The accumulated worth 
of the loans reached HUF 15 billion be-
tween 2008–2011, and although the new 
conservative government in power from 
2010 introduced many helpful measures 
to solve the problem, the accumulated 
worth still remained HUF 4 billion in the 
summer of 2014 (Bodzási, 2015).
The extensive popularity of foreign 
currency loans in the years preceding the 
crisis was due to a sort of groupthink pat-
tern. An empirical study carried out by 
young researchers on the reasons under-
lying the spread of the foreign currency 
loans traces it back to three main factors: 
1) the successful aggressive marketing 
campaigns carried out by credit institu-
tions; 2) the lack of basic financial litera-
cy among the population; and 3) that the 
few warnings about the possible adverse 
consequences could not get through. 
(These three factors are, of course, inter-
dependent.) Regarding the first factor, 
the advertisements of the banks involved 
– especially the advertisements on televi-
sion – used a sort of extremely manipu-
lative tone and symbols to convince peo-
ple that these products were the easiest 
way to receive funding, in comparison to 
ordinary credit assessment procedures. 
Regarding the second factor, two other 
empirical studies should be quoted. The 
2010 OECD assessment of financial lit-
eracy found that even in comparison to 
other countries in the CEE-region, the 
Hungarian population was the most un-
educated in this field. The 2011 research 
carried out by the National Bank of Hun-
gary on financial literacy also had worry-
ing results. Although 67% of the respond-
ents claimed to make regular efforts at 
understanding finances, other responses 
revealed that 40% were not absolutely or 
mostly confident in this field, and only 
20% claimed to be completely confident. 
One seventh of the population did not 
have experience with any kind of finan-
cial product at all, including the simplest 
bank account. Regarding the third factor, 
the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Au-
thority – which was then integrated into 
the Hungarian National Bank in 1st Oc-
tober 2013 – had no power to restrict for-
eign currency lending. Nevertheless, they 
warned credit institutions as well as the 
population, but without much success. 
Also, a small part of the media published 
articles with warnings, but these also re-
mained ineffective (Bagány et al., 2015).
Now, the above facts clearly suggest 
that the antecedent conditions and symp-
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toms of groupthink are in place. The case 
is also somewhat similar to the negative 
example of financial online communi-
ties mentioned above. Regarding the 
antecedent conditions: 1) stress stems 
from the need for funding (of a real es-
tate transaction or any kind of spending); 
2) group cohesion and group insulation can 
be traced back to the part of the popula-
tion trying to take advantage of a solution 
they did not really see through or under-
stand in its complexity; and 3) in connec-
tion with these, the aggressive market-
ing campaigns of the credit institutions, 
along with the peer pressure and the lack 
of proper warnings to the population, 
means that the intentions of the banking 
sector turned into a virtual directive leader-
ship in this case. Many of the symptoms 
were also found: the unquestioned belief 
in the group’s inherent morality; the ef-
forts to rationalise (on the basis of the 
irrational); self-censorship about the pos-
sible adverse consequences, and once the 
problems had escalated, false hopes in 
some kind of a miraculous redemption; 
and so on.
To sum it up, in the author’s opinion, 
the foreign currency lending disaster is 
an example of groupthink, and perhaps 
one of the worst ones in modern Hungar-
ian history. It could have been prevented 
by a more responsible approach of the 
incumbent government, by a stricter fi-
nancial regulatory and supervisory sys-
tem, and most importantly with proper 
financial education. 
 
Instead of a conclusion 
It is relatively difficult to draw a general 
conclusion or to suggest a general solu-
tion for combatting groupthink, since 
the latter has not been developed yet. 
What seems to be sure is that the an-
tecedent conditions and symptoms of 
groupthink are well identifiable in most 
cases, and this enables decision-makers 
to take steps to combat groupthink or to 
mitigate its adverse impacts. Among the 
possible means, diversity seems to be the 
most time-honoured solution. Due to the 
gravity of the problem, further research 
and studies will likely be conducted on it 
in the future, and new methods will cer-
tainly be devised. However, we should not 
forget that the simplest but most signifi-
cant practices have been available since 
Biblical Times. Another important thing 
to keep in mind is that governments and 
competent authorities should always be 
careful in granting authorisation for loan 
constructions, because the groupthink ef-
fect can manifest itself and lead to grave 
consequences.
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